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Abstract
Background: The investigation of potential exposure to anthrax spores in a Trenton, New Jersey,
mail-processing facility required rapid assessment of informatics needs and adaptation of existing
informatics tools to new physical and information-processing environments. Because the affected
building and its computers were closed down, data to list potentially exposed persons and map
building floor plans were unavailable from the primary source.
Results: Controlling the effects of anthrax contamination required identification and follow-up of
potentially exposed persons. Risk of exposure had to be estimated from the geographic
relationship between work history and environmental sample sites within the contaminated facility.
To assist in establishing geographic relationships, floor plan maps of the postal facility were
constructed in ArcView Geographic Information System (GIS) software and linked to a database of
personnel and visitors using Epi Info and Epi Map 2000. A repository for maintaining the latest
versions of various documents was set up using Web page hyperlinks.
Conclusions:  During public health emergencies, such as bioterrorist attacks and disease
epidemics, computerized information systems for data management, analysis, and communication
may be needed within hours of beginning the investigation. Available sources of data and output
requirements of the system may be changed frequently during the course of the investigation.
Integrating data from a variety of sources may require entering or importing data from a variety of
digital and paper formats. Spatial representation of data is particularly valuable for assessing
environmental exposure. Written documents, guidelines, and memos important to the epidemic
were frequently revised. In this investigation, a database was operational on the second day and the
GIS component during the second week of the investigation.
Background
In September 2001 Anthrax spores were intentionally sent
through the US Postal System. At least four letters contain-
ing spores of Bacillus anthracis were sent to a U.S. Senator's
office and to media centers in different parts of the coun-
try. Two cases reported in Florida were followed by two
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cases in New York. A few days later, four more cases
occurred among postal workers at the Brentwood mail
processing facility in the Washington area. [1]
The appearance of new cases in different locations around
the country suggested contamination with B. anthracis of
several postal facilities. In each location, the population
potentially exposed was large. Public health, criminal
investigation, and postal authorities at local, state and fed-
eral levels investigated the suspected bioterrorism event.
Within hours of the discovery of clusters of cases, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC)
deployed teams to four different locations to support state
and local investigations.
Four letters containing anthrax spores were known to
have been postmarked and processed in the Hamilton
Mail Processing Center (HMPC) located in Hamilton
Township, a suburb of Trenton, New Jersey. The HMPC is
part of a complicated network of stations and buildings
designed to move millions of pieces of mail per day. It is
not a typical post office, but a very large facility located in
a 281,387 square foot building with many operations
areas containing mechanized equipment. It was typically
staffed by 250 employees per shift and visited by numer-
ous others in the course of processing 2 million items per
day.
On October 19,,,,, field investigation in Trenton was initi-
ated by a CDC team composed of an epidemiologist, envi-
ronmental experts, occupational physicians, Epidemic
Intelligence Service (EIS) officers, a Public Health Infor-
matics Fellow, and support personnel. The team was
headquartered in the New Jersey Department of Health
and Senior Services (NJDHSS) and had access to the Local
Area Network and computing environment of the Depart-
ment. Other CDC investigation teams were sent to Flor-
ida, Washington, and New York.
A detailed account of the New Jersey epidemiologic inves-
tigation has recently been published [2]. This article
describes the experience of the Informatics Fellow and the
New Jersey Geographic Information System(GIS) Coordi-
nator during the first two weeks of the investigation in
assessing information system needs and organizing on-
site computer support for the New Jersey arm of the
investigation.
Results
Assessment of Information Needs
Early in the investigation, the number of people exposed
to anthrax was estimated to be large. The response team
planned to sample for anthrax contamination in the facil-
ity; identify the exposed population; locate, culture, and
give prophylactic antibiotics to those most likely to be
exposed; and monitor the exposed and treated persons
over time for potential long-term effects. Information on
each person and sample was to be obtained, stored, ana-
lyzed, and augmented over time. For epidemiologic inves-
tigation and management purposes, summary reports had
to be generated frequently. Because of the large number of
agencies involved and the rapid progress of events, a sys-
tem of document management for the many drafts of
guidelines and other communications was also needed.
Immediate needs for output included lists of employees,
clients, visitors, and other potentially exposed persons.
The lists were used by EIS officers for individual follow-up
and were linked to the map of floor plans of the postal
facility and environmental sampling results to help iden-
tify persons with the greatest likelihood of exposure.
Investigators and managers needed summary informa-
tion, including the percentage of exposed patients receiv-
ing medication and the distribution of exposed persons
by county. The media relations' officer of the team pro-
duced reports as often as twice a day for the public. Table
1 contains a list of information needs.
Not all potential data sources were available during the
investigation. The postal facility was closed until an envi-
ronmental assessment could be completed. The database
system in the building was unavailable, as the computers
had been turned off due to concern that fans in the com-
puters might create air currents that would jeopardize
safety or alter environmental sampling results. The list of
employees in the facility computers was therefore unavail-
able to the investigators and had to be assembled from
other sources. Digital AutoCAD drawing files of the facil-
ity were also stored on a workstation within the facility,
and were likewise unavailable – a situation that compli-
cated the production of accurate and representative floor-
plan maps.
Laboratory results included cultures of both human and
environmental samples performed by the New Jersey State
laboratory and CDC laboratories. Managing reports from
samples processed in different laboratories required link-
ing of multiple unique identifiers. Later a tracking system
for samples processed in more than one laboratory was
developed.
Electronic documents that were produced or revised dur-
ing the investigation included survey results, background
documents, guidelines, antibiotic stockpile logistics, and
press releases. Frequent revisions made it necessary to
identify and provide access to the latest documents and to
track document revisions.International Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
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Table 1: Information needs of the emergency response team in New Jersey
Information requirement Use
Number of people exposed Control Measures
• Implementation of screening procedures
• Determination of amount of drugs/vaccine
• Deployment of drugs/vaccine/antidotes
Follow-up
• Number of people exposed
• People who are receiving chemoprophylaxis
• Centers providing follow up services and number of patients lost
• Loss of follow-up
Line listings During the initial investigation
• Case finding
• Identification of people at risk
• People who did not report to work/school
• People admitted to hospitals that meet case definition
• People who did not attend screening programs
• People not receiving post exposure prophylaxis(PEP)
During PEP
• Dissemination of information such as screening test, changes in PEP protocols,
• Changes in facilities available for screening/treatment
• Changes in recommendations
• Case finding if the definition of exposed changes based on preliminary data
After the control measures are implemented
• Follow-up of adverse reactions
• Follow-up of special populations such as pregnant women and children
• Suspected cases under investigation
• Cases ruled out
• Cases ruled in
Clinical information During Initial Investigation
• Location of suspected cases
• Location of confirmed cases
• Status of confirmatory test
• Clinical condition of cases
Follow-up
• Clinical status
• Disposition
Geographic Information Systems Base Data
• Floor plan map linkable to databases
Case finding
• County/Zip code of exposed populations
• Hospital locations
• Driving directions to hospitals, operation centers, and affected facilities
Surveillance
• The number and location of emergency rooms
• Hospitals included in the surveillance system
• Sentinel sites
Environmental
• Distribution of the sampling
• Proportion of positive samples
• Extension of the contamination
Epidemiology
• Spatial relationship between cases and exposed population
• Identification of unexposed populations
• Identification of exposed population not included during the initial assessment
• Distribution of cases
• Distribution of deaths
• Geographic distribution patterns
Guidelines Guidelines for treatments
• Frequently asked questions(FAQ) for the emergency response center
• FAQ for the pressInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
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System Implementation
The information system developed consisted of three
main components: a database of possibly exposed per-
sons, a GIS of the physical plant and equipment, and a
document repository. The exposed-person database
required merging of files in multiple formats, manual data
entry, rapid analysis, and frequent production of reports.
GIS work was done using floor plans produced in ArcView
GIS 3.2a (Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc.,
Redlands, CA http://www.esri.com) by screen-digitizing
scanned not-to-scale xerographic copies of AutoCAD
drawings of the postal building. Documents were made
available to the team by using Web pages (HTML) on the
New Jersey Department of Health intranet to link to the
latest copies of the files.
Building outlines, walls, work areas, equipment, furni-
ture, the ventilation system and diffusers, and environ-
mental sampling locations were digitized and stored as
shapefiles, a format used by both the ArcView GIS and Epi
Map software. The geographical features were then linked
to environmental sampling data to specific locations in
the building using Epi Map [3]. A unique sample identifi-
cation number was used as the key for linking the shape-
file to the environmental sample database (Figure 1). As
the map creation process progressed over the 2-week
period, additional, larger size paper drawings were pro-
vided to which a complete floor plan and heating, venti-
lation, and air conditioning systems components could be
added. Another version of the floor plan has been pub-
lished and is available on the Internet [2].
To support investigations in other facilities where the let-
ters were manipulated, digitized floor plans of the Cart-
eret and West Trenton Post Offices were produced from
rudimentary sketches. Since Epi Map is public domain
software, it was installed on a number of computers with-
out need for licensing making a GIS tool freely available
to the investigators.
The document repository was created using HTML on an
intranet site inside the firewall of the NJDHSS. The Web
page included up-to-date information such as press
releases and a list of activities for the day. It was updated
twice a day or more often when important information
had to be communicated to the rest of the investigation
team. The repository page also included hyperlinks to the
most recent version of important documents. Each link
was checked on a daily basis to ensure that the correct doc-
ument was being accessed. The page also provided a list of
databases available to team members.
Discussion
Recent publications on informatics and bioterrorism have
focused on detection of bioterrorist events [4,5]. Some
have reviewed the informatics contribution to past emer-
gencies and formulated proposals for various kinds of sur-
veillance and/or response [6-10]. The goal of this paper is
to present needs, difficulties, and solutions encountered
in the first 2 weeks of a single field investigation. Every
epidemic investigation is unique, but a comprehensive
review of activities carried out during an actual investiga-
tion may focus discussion on understanding and improv-
ing the informatics response in such events.
• Recommendation for clinicians
• Guidelines for staff
• Elements of information necessary
• Software algorithms implemented in other locations
• Sensitivity and specificity of screening methods
Documentation During the initial investigation
• Drafts for guidelines in different versions
• Drafts for paper forms to be used in all stages of the investigation
• Customized reports
Laboratory Results During the case finding
• Number of samples in the laboratory
• Number of positive samples
• Results of confirmatory tests
• Laboratories involved
• Discrepancies between laboratories
Logistics During the whole operation
• Team list
• Cell phones
• Email addresses
• Distribution by hotel, team, activities
• Emergency contact numbers
Table 1: Information needs of the emergency response team in New Jersey (Continued)International Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
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At the beginning of this investigation, significant effort
was expended to identify the information needed and
sources for that information. Although the NJDHSS pro-
vided a secure computer environment in which to work,
many elements of the system had to be designed and set
up during the investigation. Much of the base information
did not exist (e.g., GIS of the Hamilton facility) or had
been made unavailable by the event under investigation
(e.g., Hamilton facility AutoCAD digital drawing files and
employee lists). As in most field investigations, both data
sources and hypotheses shifted and evolved over the
course of the investigation.
During an investigation, information is critical for deci-
sion-making processes and for detection of cases, identifi-
cation of risk factors, and managing prevention and
control measures. In the first hours or days, the emergency
response team is required to design and implement an
information system capable of providing reliable, timely
information. Being prepared means that much of this is
already in place. Experience in developing such
"emergency information systems" and with the software
being used plays an important role in determining the
time needed to complete the task.
In this event, close collaboration between the epidemiol-
ogist and informaticians was supported by software
designed for field investigation and for exchange of data
with other commercial products. The presence of trained
professionals from a GIS center was an important element
in being able to map the site of the investigation. Use of
industry standard shapefiles and Microsoft Access data-
(Environmental.png) Preliminary Sampling at the Mail Facility 1 Figure 1
(Environmental.png) Preliminary Sampling at the Mail Facility 1International Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
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bases allowed working copies to be distributed and used
in public domain software as needed. A database system
was operational within two days of the beginning of oper-
ations, and the GIS elements evolved over a two-week
period as floor plans became available.
Potential problems identified initially included lags in
entry of clinical data, lack of access to data sources because
computer systems were disrupted or inaccessible, and the
variety of formats and platforms that were designed for
other purposes. At least one source produced data in dif-
ferent formats on different days.
In field investigation, both physical and informatics envi-
ronments must be dealt with as they are encountered. The
informatics environment is defined by the agencies, net-
works, and individual computers from which data are
obtained and with which exchange of data occurs. Unless
the entire investigation is internal to a single agency or
company, each of the partners – state, county, health care
facility, law enforcement agency, industry, or other entity
– has its own informatics environment. The standards
most likely to be common to all the partners are those of
the computer industry, such as the Internet, Microsoft
Windows, and popular GIS standards. Those conducting
the investigation must be prepared to adapt to the stand-
ards used by the data source partners rather than the
reverse.
In this investigation, existing database systems provided
useful information, but the data items were available on
paper, in Excel files, in text files, in Access files, and in
ArcView shapefiles. The informatician is responsible for
merging and integrating elements stored in different data-
base formats to make the information available to the
emergency response team. The need for a speedy public
health response is a challenge for informaticians because
the steps that are typically time consuming, such as
requirements generation, analysis, design, implementa-
tion, and testing of a new system, must be completed in
hours rather than in weeks or months. In this experience,
some parts of the system were functional within two days
after arrival at the investigation site.
Epi Info 2000 http://www.cdc.gov/epiinfo was used to set
up databases for manual data entry and updating and for
importing and merging data provided by collaborating
sources in a variety of Microsoft Windows formats. The
system developed took advantage of several features avail-
able in Epi Info [3] through its use of commercial compo-
nent software and computer industry standards:
• Rapid development of a relational database, in which
identifying information was localized to a single table for
security purposes
• Importation of data from several of the 20 different file
formats that can be read in Epi Info 2000
• The ability to perform data management interactively
but to preserve and replay the steps through automatically
generated programs or scripts
• The ability to link and display Microsoft Access data
with ArcView shapefiles to create maps
• Rapid development, with minimal coding, simplifying
the testing and debugging process
• The ability to add or delete variables from a database
merely by revising a form on the screen.
• The availability of analytic output and epidemiologic
statistics in the same program used for data management
• Interaction with high end GIS programs and transition
of database management to a commercial program
through Epi Info's incorporation of GIS and Windows
standards
• Public domain status of the program allowed down-
loading the latest version from the Internet and distribut-
ing it to any number of partners without licensing
difficulties
Geographical and spatial analysis has gained importance
in public health during the last few years. Maps reveal spa-
tial relationships and facilitate communication. The avail-
ability of maps during the investigation can be attributed
to the fact that the NJDHSS had made resources available
from its GIS center. The GIS professional was able to cre-
ate the shapefiles while the rest of the emergency response
team (ERT) focused on data collection and data manage-
ment. Once created, maps were widely available for use
among all members of the team, and Epi Map 2000 could
be used to link data in Microsoft Access files to the shape-
files of the building floor plans.
The main use of GIS in this investigation was to create a
relatively detailed base map and to locate environmental
sampling and provide spatial analysis and visual support
to the investigation. We identified and located all samples
taken in the different facilities. In a matter of days we con-
nected the database system with the map files to provide
up to date information regarding sample processing and
results. The maps created provided a new perspective of
the magnitude of contamination inside the facility and
also identified non-contaminated areas.
We extended the mapping capabilities to illustrate the
area of coverage of the active and passive surveillance sys-International Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
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tems implemented in surrounding communities for the
detection of new cases (Figure 2). The surveillance system
was originally restricted to nine counties and was latter
extended to others. Changes in the number of centers
included in the surveillance system were reflected in dif-
ferent versions of the same map to document changes
over time.
Because of the diversity of the data sources during the
investigation, the database system required frequent
maintenance. We were able to automate most of the data
management routines using Epi Info program (scripting)
files and to produce automatic reports.
Laboratory results were available through the local area
network in the New Jersey State Health Department where
the team worked. Although we might have been able to
connect to the laboratory system to obtain real-time
updates, for security reasons, the laboratory results for the
investigation were exported and became available to the
Emergency Response Team at the end of each day. There
was therefore a modest, but significant delay in availabil-
ity of laboratory information.
During emergency field situations, staff rotation may
present problems. In this investigation field staff rotated
every two weeks. Any system intended for use by more
than one group of people should be easy to use, compati-
ble with other software, and well documented. The data-
base was documented using entity relationship (ER)
diagrams (Figure 3). Epi Info has a command to display
the structure of a table, making it easy to document the
system for the replacement team that arrived after two
weeks. This second team preferred to work with Microsoft
Access rather than Epi Info, but the fact that Epi Info 2000
stores data in generic Access 97 tables facilitated the
transition.
Document tracking and version control are important
when geographically separated teams are working on the
same set of problems. In this case each one of the field
sites had a set of experts developing documents and rec-
ommendations that applied to the whole event and not
only to the geographic area of investigation. It was impor-
tant to keep the most recent set of recommendations
available to all members of the emergency response team
for decision-making and information dissemination. Dur-
ing the investigation, we were able to access the most
recent documents with minimal effort, using links in a
Web page. A more sophisticated version could be devel-
oped to allow tracking changes in a document over time.
Conclusions
Emergency situations require rapid design and implemen-
tation of databases to provide reliable information in the
field. Having the ability to respond rapidly to emergency
situations requires planning and preparedness. Key ele-
ments in preparation are in paying sufficient attention to
informatics support and having both staff and software
that can adapt quickly to new situations and computing
environments. The likelihood of success is greater if the
same people and software provide support for more rou-
tine epidemic investigations
In this field investigation, the informatics environment
included Excel spreadsheets, files in several other formats,
paper questionnaires and computer printouts, an existing
GIS capability using ArcView, and the need for frequent
revisions in database structure, frequent summary reports,
and protection of personal identifiers. Software for field
use must be flexible enough to interact with and unite
numerous data sources and computing environments.
Investigators must be prepared for new situations, and be
ready to adapt new techniques and software as the needs
of an investigation unfold.
The traditional steps in systems development of require-
ments gathering, analysis, design, implementation, and
testing must be traversed in rapid sequence during the first
few hours or days of an investigation and repeated again
as the system evolves and capabilities are added. More for-
malized approach to systems development needs to be
either extensively modified or compressed to account for
the time-critical nature of the situation. The use of com-
mercial software standards such as Windows file formats,
Web pages, and mainstream GIS programs facilitates the
rapid implementation of systems in the field.
Electronic documents were as important as more struc-
tured data for this investigation. The design of systems for
emergencies should include methods for storing and
maintaining version control of documents and images in
addition to more structured data.
Methods
Geographic Information System
A critical component was the Geographic Information
System. A floor plan of the contaminated Hamilton facil-
ity was available only as an incomplete and poor quality
8 1/2 × 11 inch photocopy of the original 'E' sized Auto-
CAD drawing. It was scanned as a TIFF image, imported
into ArcView GIS 3.2 software and used as a backdrop to
create shapefiles of the building outline, walls, opera-
tional areas and equipment placements, and NIOSH and
FBI sampling locations. Attribute tables were also created
for each of the GIS theme features. Shapefiles were devel-
oped using a scanned copy of the floor plan of each facil-
ity and digitized using ArcView®. The elements of
information to be displayed were divided into severalInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
Page 8 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
(Surveillance.png) Surveillance of New Cases in New Jersey Figure 2
(Surveillance.png) Surveillance of New Cases in New JerseyInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
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(DatabaseModel.eps) Example of the Entity Relationship Diagram for the Database System implemented Figure 3
(DatabaseModel.eps) Example of the Entity Relationship Diagram for the Database System implementedInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2003, 2 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/2/1/8
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layers showing samples taken by different agencies and
their location.
After completion, the shapefiles were linked to the data
using Epi Map 2000, a component of Epi Info that is
ArcView® compatible. Elements of information stored in
databases created in Epi Info 2000 were sent directly to
Epi Map for displaying (Figure 1). The process was auto-
mated by using scripts or programs.
Data Collection and Input
To obtain data on persons possibly exposed, a liaison
between the U.S. Postal Service and the epidemiologic
team was appointed. He was able to obtain MS-Excel© files
or computer printouts listing personnel for each of the
facilities under investigation. The lists were originally cre-
ated for payroll or vehicle registration. Additional infor-
mation was added to those lists to record presence in the
facility during the exposure period, sex of the employee,
and post exposure prophylaxis (PEP). Most of the clinical
follow-up services, including PEP, were provided by the
local hospital. The informatics department of the hospital
extracted relevant clinical data from the database system
and made them available to the investigation team as
Excel tables on some days and comma delimited text files
on other days.
Primary data items collected by EIS officers and other staff
were entered into Epi Info 2000 or into Excel and then
imported into Epi Info 2000 (Microsoft Access 97) for-
mat. Potentially exposed populations such as regular visi-
tors and relatives of postal workers were identified and
manually entered into the main database as the investiga-
tion proceeded.
Demographic characteristics of potentially exposed per-
sons were assembled from various sources, including the
local hospital where PEP was administered. When PEP
was offered to a large group of people, tracking of different
treatment protocols and their results became necessary.
Paper forms were designed not to become obsolete if pro-
tocols are modified during the follow up, and similar revi-
sions in the database were expected.
Database Management
Database management was done in Epi Info 2000, the
Windows version of Epi Info [3]. Epi Info 2000 was devel-
oped at CDC from commercial component software and
Visual Basic and offers compatibility with Microsoft
Access files and 20 other standard database formats. It
includes a mapping program that uses the ArcView com-
patible shapefile format and allows the display of data
from Access tables on shapefiles. Most of the basic statis-
tics needed for reporting and analysis are built in so that
we did not have to spend time coding or debugging algo-
rithms. The data collection and data management tools in
Epi Info do not require expert database managers.
The database system consisted of a central database
designed and maintained in Epi Info 2000. The system
was structured in 14 tables linked by a unique key. The
unique key at first contained information (was "intelli-
gent"), but we designed a mechanism to replace intelli-
gent keys by non-intelligent keys. The intelligent key
contained facility code, deployment place (NJ) exposed
unique identifier, and postal facility involved. We
included the deployment site in the key assuming that the
information would be linked with other sites at a latter
time.
Security
From the beginning of the operation, security was a con-
cern. Because of the complexity of the investigation we
decided that all sensitive information – defined as infor-
mation that would allow identification of specific individ-
uals – would be handled separately from the rest of the
database. We created a single flat table with all identifiers
and related the table to the rest of the database system.
With that structure, we were able to handle sensitive infor-
mation as a unit. Identifiers were not sent to CDC Head-
quarters in Atlanta, for example, and sensitive data were
protected by the security features of the NJDHSS comput-
ing environment.
Document Management
A commercial HTML editor (Microsoft Front Page 2000®)
was used for the maintenance of the document repository
Web page. Web pages included in the system did not con-
tain any special scripting that required an advanced Web
programming techniques. The level of HTML coding was
basic, and mostly inserted automatically by Front Page.
The document repository allowed coding and storing ver-
sions of documents during the progress of the
investigation. Documents were organized in folders and
assigned code numbers.
Members of the team were instructed to check in docu-
ments on a regular basis. The document check-in process
included a simple computer-based form with the name of
the document, the author, and a time stamp. The first two
elements were used to create a catalog, and the timestamp
was used for versioning control.
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